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Labor Adjustment under Different Institutional Structures:
A Case Study of Germany and the United States
Abstract
Like most Western European countries, Germany stringently regulates dismissals and
layoffs.  Critics contend that this regulation raises the costs of employment adjustment and hence
impedes employers' ability to respond to fluctuations in demand.  Other German labor policies,
however, most especially the availability of unemployment insurance benefits for those on short
time, facilitate the adjustment of average hours per worker in lieu of layoffs.
Building on earlier work, we compare the adjustment of employment, hours and
inventories to demand shocks in the German and U.S. manufacturing sectors.  We find that, in
the short run, whereas U.S. employers rely principally on the adjustment of employment levels
to respond to demand shocks, German employers rely principally on the adjustment of average
hours per worker.  The adjustment of overall labor input is generally similar in the two countries.
Short-time work makes a very important contribution to short-run hours adjustment in Germany.
We find little evidence that inventories help to buffer demand fluctuations in either country.  Our
findings suggest that, given appropriate supporting institutions, strong worker job security can
be compatible with employers' need for flexibility in staffing levels.
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1     For summaries of recent changes to employment protection laws in Western Europe, see Maury (1985), Vranken1
(1986) and Houseman (1990).
     For an elaboration of these arguments, see OECD (1986) and Soltwedel (1988).  2
     Wall Street Journal, October 12, 1993.3
Labor Adjustment under Different Institutional Structures:
A Case Study of Germany and the United States
I. Introduction 
Historically, U.S. employers have had the right to hire and fire at will.  Adjustment to
downturns has been accomplished largely through layoffs, rather than through reductions in
average hours per worker or other alternatives to layoffs.  In contrast, in Germany, as in most
Western European countries, workers historically have enjoyed strong job rights, including the
right to advance notice of layoff and the right to severance pay or to negotiations over
compensation for layoff.  
In recent years, laws and practices concerning collective dismissals have been under
scrutiny both in the United States and in many Western European countries, including Germany.
In the United States, the massive dislocations of the 1970's and early 1980's pushed many
workers out of their jobs and have led to growing pressure for legislated and collectively
bargained job rights.  Perhaps most significantly, a new law requiring large employers to give
60 days' notice of plant closings and major layoffs was passed by the U.S. Congress in 1988.
Ironically, at the same time that the United States has been moving to strengthen workers' job
security, many European countries have weakened their job security legislation in an effort to
promote greater labor market flexibility.   In Germany, the Employment Promotion Act of 19851
relaxed certain regulations on layoffs and permitted greater use of temporary and fixed-term
contracts.
Central to the debate over workers' rights to job security on both sides of the Atlantic has
been their presumed adverse impact on labor market flexibility.  Critics have claimed that strong
job rights prevent employers from adjusting to economic fluctuations and secular changes in
demand.  It also has been alleged that, by inhibiting layoffs during downturns, strong job security
provisions reduce employers' willingness to hire during upturns and thereby contribute to high
levels of unemployment.   A forthcoming EC white paper reportedly will recommend that2
European governments further weaken their employment protection laws.3
Relatively little research, however, has been done on the effects of employment protection
laws on labor market adjustment.  Although German employment protection laws in and of
themselves would be expected to slow the adjustment of employment to changes in demand, the
magnitude of these effects is not known.  Moreover, it does not necessarily follow that the costs
2of adjusting labor are higher in Germany than in the United States and consequently that German
employers adjust less quickly to changing demand conditions.  To determine the relative costs of
adjusting labor in Germany and the United States, one must consider other relevant labor market
institutions in both countries.  For example, because the unemployment insurance (UI) system
in the United States is experience rated, U.S. employers generally incur higher UI taxes when
they lay off workers; although German employers face greater regulation of layoffs than do
American employers, they incur no tax penalties associated with layoffs.  Moreover, German
employment protection laws may inhibit the use of layoffs, but other German policies, such as
unemployment compensation for workers on short time, facilitate the use of alternatives to
layoffs, including work sharing.  Elsewhere (Abraham and Houseman, 1993, forthcoming) we
present evidence to suggest that, although German employers adjust employment levels more
slowly than their U.S. counterparts in response to demand changes, they make larger short run
adjustments to average hours per worker.  Differences in total labor adjustment tend to be small.
In this paper we build upon our previous work examining employment and hours
adjustment in the former West Germany and the United States.  We use an interrelated factor
demand model to jointly estimate employment and hours adjustment in the manufacturing sectors
of the two countries.  Results based on this model strengthen the conclusions drawn in our earlier
work.
  Because the availability of UI benefits for short-time work in Germany facilitates the use
of work sharing as an alternative to layoffs there, we also consider the contribution that short-time
work makes to total labor adjustment.  In addition, we review evidence on the effects of changes
in employment protection laws on labor adjustment in Germany.  Finally, we look at whether and
to what extent finished goods inventories help to smooth fluctuations in production in Germany
and the United States.  If labor adjustment costs are greater in Germany than in the United States,
as is usually presumed, we would expect finished goods inventories to play a more important
buffer role in Germany, thereby mitigating the need to adjust labor input to demand changes
there.  
II. The German and U.S. Industrial Relations Systems 
We interpret differences in employment and hours adjustment patterns in Germany and
the United States in light of the two countries' labor market institutions, and so begin with an
overview of selected features of their industrial relations systems.  The German and U.S.
industrial relations systems differ in many respects, but the most relevant for our present purposes
are differences in layoff policies, UI rules and regulations concerning the use of overtime.
Germany
In Germany, as in most Western European countries, there is a long tradition of requiring
employers to give advance notice of dismissal to individual workers.  The first advance notice law
3     Required notice periods can be circumvented through voluntary severance agreements under which workers quit in4
return for some monetary compensation.  Such agreements have been common.  A 1990 decision of the Federal
Constitutional Court declared the disparate treatment of blue-collar and white-collar workers in advance notice law to
be unconstitutional and ordered parliament to pass new legislation providing for equal notice.
     German dismissal law and the role of the works council in the event of a collective dismissal are discussed by Bruche5
and Reissert (1984), Sengenberger (1985) and Weiss (1985).
in Germany was passed during the 1920's.  Today, required periods of notice to individual
workers vary from two weeks to six months, depending upon whether the worker holds a blue-
collar or a white-collar job and upon his or her seniority and age.   4
In addition to stipulating advance notice for individual workers, German law gives the
works council, a legally-mandated body of elected worker representatives, important powers in
the event of a collective dismissal.  Under current law, employers must keep both the works
council and the local employment office advised of any developments that might lead to a
collective dismissal over the next twelve months, and must consult the works council "as soon
as possible" when contemplating such a layoff.  The most important provision of the current law
was introduced in 1973 and requires that, in cases of collective dismissal at an establishment
normally employing more than twenty employees, management and the works council must
negotiate a social plan that stipulates compensation for workers who lose their jobs.  In the event
that the two parties cannot agree on a social plan, the law provides for binding arbitration.  The
social plan requirement greatly enhances the works council's power to influence management
decisions with respect to employment and hours adjustment. 
Although social plans are required only in the event of a collective dismissal, the number
of workers who must be laid off for a layoff to fall into this category is not particularly high.  For
example, prior to 1985, for establishments with 60 to 250 workers, a collective dismissal was
defined as the layoff of 10 percent of the work force over a 30-day period; for establishments
employing 500 or more workers, the threshold was just 30 dismissed workers over a 30-day
period.  The Employment Promotion Act of 1985 raised these thresholds somewhat and gave new
enterprises a four-year exemption from the social plan requirement.5
Settlements in social plans vary considerably from case to case, and depend upon the
worker's tenure and wage, as well as the company's financial condition.  A recent study by
Hemmer (1988) provides the best available data on the amounts of compensation paid out.  In a
sample of 145 social plans negotiated between 1980 and 1985, the median settlement was between
10,000 and 15,000 DM per recipient, or about 15 to 25 weeks pay for a person with average
blue-collar industrial earnings.  The fact that a social plan is required only in situations involving
a mass layoff creates an incentive for the firm to rely on attrition and perhaps on smaller layoffs
spread out over time instead of on a mass layoff.
As in the United States, German workers who are laid off are eligible to collect UI
benefits.  The payroll tax that finances these benefits, however, is not experience rated so that,
4     The German short-time system is discussed by Flechsenhar (1980) and Grais (1983).6
     See General Accounting Office (1986) for survey results on the incidence of advance notice and severance pay.7
     At least 50 workers must be affected, and therefore small establishments are exempted from any notice requirement.8
The requirements of advance notice also apply if 500 or more workers are laid off, even if they do not constitute at least
one-third of the work force.
unlike their U.S. counterparts, German employers incur no increase in UI tax liability when they
lay off workers.  Because of the advance notice and other requirements associated with collective
dismissals, temporary layoffs are virtually unknown in Germany.  The German UI system does
provide for short-time benefits.  With the approval of the Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (Employment
Service), firms can reduce employees' hours of work and those employees can collect pro-rated
UI benefits, which are financed in the same way as benefits to laid off workers.  Firms applying
for short-time benefits must show that other measures for accommodating the fall in demand, such
as reductions in overtime and rebuilding inventories, have already been taken.6
In contrast to U.S. law, German law contains no provision covering overtime premia,
which instead are governed by the terms of industry-level collective bargaining agreements.  The
typical agreement provides for an overtime premium of about 20 percent, which is considerably
lower than the 50 percent premium mandated by U.S. law.
  Although the availability of subsidized short-time benefits and the low overtime premium
that is typical in German collective bargaining agreements can be expected to encourage reliance
on hours adjustments by German employers, it should be noted that any change in scheduled
hours at an establishment must be approved by the works council.  Works councils, however, are
generally accommodating in these matters.
The United States
 The situation with respect to advance notice of layoffs and negotiation over layoffs
historically has been quite different in the United States.  Prior to 1988, advance notice of layoffs
and plant closings was required in only three states:  Maine, Wisconsin, and Hawaii.  In the
absence of any national law requiring advance notice, workers often received little or no warning
prior to being let go.   In 1988 the U.S. Congress passed the Worker Adjustment and Retraining7
Notification Act.  The law, which took effect in 1989, requires employers to give workers and
state and local government officials sixty days' advance notice before a mass layoff or plant
closure.  In general, a mass layoff is defined as a layoff of at least one-third of the work force
at a single site within a thirty-day period or a situation in which at least one-third of the workers
have their hours reduced by at least 50 percent for six months.8
The U.S. advance notice law is far weaker than German collective dismissal law.  The
requirement that employers negotiate a social plan with the works council is widely regarded as
the most important in German collective dismissal law.  U.S. law does not require that companies
5     Unemployment Insurance Financial Data, published by the U.S. Department of Labor, contains data on weekly9
benefit amounts, weekly wages in covered employment, and the duration of benefit receipt.  Vroman (1989) discusses
alternative estimates of the degree of experience rating.
consult with worker representatives or pay compensation to laid-off workers.  Moreover, even
the advance notice requirement in existing U.S. law appears to be having little effect.  A recent
survey by the General Accounting Office (1993) found that three quarters of all companies that
had workforce reductions of a sufficient scale to trigger notice requirements either failed to file
notice or gave less than 60 days' notice.  These findings suggest that in most cases companies
either slip through the law's large loopholes or simply fail to comply with the law.
Although U.S. employers are not required to make severance payments to laid-off
workers, the fact that the U.S. UI system is experience rated means that layoffs may lead to an
increase in UI tax liability.  For a U.S. employer, the effective UI cost of laying off a worker
depends upon three things:  his or her weekly benefit amount; the duration of benefit receipt; and
the share of benefits for which the employer ultimately pays through higher UI taxes.  Weekly
benefit amounts average roughly 35 percent of weekly wages; the average duration of benefit
receipt varies somewhat over the business cycle, but has averaged about 14 weeks; and, at the
margin, a typical employer bears about 60 percent of the cost of benefits paid to laid-off workers
(though many employers are already paying the maximum UI tax rate and thus incur no increase
in costs if they lay off additional workers).   Thus, a rough estimate of the UI cost to a typical9
employer of laying off another worker is about three weeks' wages in the form of increased UI
tax liability.
Paying UI benefits to workers whose hours have been reduced is a recent innovation in
the United States.  Only seventeen states have laws allowing pro-rated payment of UI benefits to
workers whose hours are reduced under approved worksharing plans, and most of these laws
were passed in 1985 or later.  Current U.S. law specifies that nonexempt employees are entitled
to a 50 percent wage premium for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week.  Although U.S.
employers are typically free to alter work schedules as they choose, both the lack of provision for
short-time benefits and the relatively high overtime premium mandated by federal law can be
expected to discourage reliance on hours adjustments.
III. Employment and Hours Adjustment
Because of the institutional differences just described, we would expect to observe quite
different patterns of labor adjustment in Germany and the United States.  Employers may adjust
labor input along two margins: the number of workers and average hours per worker.  Given the
higher costs of adjusting employment in Germany, we would expect slower adjustment of
employment to changes in the demand for labor in Germany than in the United States.  In the
event of a downturn, layoffs may be delayed by the requirement that the firm give advance notice
and, in the case of a mass layoff, further delayed by the negotiation of a social plan with the
6     Formal models of the effects of employment adjustment costs on both employment and hours are surveyed by10
Nickell (1986) and Hamermesh (1993).  Burdett and Wright (1989) model the effect of access to short-time compensation
through the UI system.  In their model, the short-time compensation subsidy associated with imperfect experience rating
increases employers' reliance on hours adjustments and raises the volatility of average hours relative to the volatility of
employment.  Even in a perfectly experience rated UI system, giving liquidity-constrained employers access to short-time
benefits for their workers may produce the same result.  Hamermesh (1993) discusses the effects of overtime premia on
the choice between hours and employment adjustments.
     The model we use here to estimate employment and hours adjustment differs from those employed in our earlier11
work.  In Abraham and Houseman (1993) we use a finite distributed lag model to describe the response of employment
and total hours to changes in shipments.  In Abraham and Houseman (forthcoming) we use Koyck models to separately
estimate the adjustment of employment and the adjustment of total hours to demand changes.  Neither model allowed the
adjustment of employment and average hours to be interrelated.  In addition, neither model allowed for the direct
comparison of employment and average hours adjustment.
(1a)
(1b)
works council.  Given that mass layoffs are relatively costly in Germany, we would expect greater
reliance on attrition to achieve desired work force reductions there than in the United States, and
might also expect layoffs to be more spread out over time.  In addition, during both downturns
and upturns, German employers are likely to delay employment adjustments until they are
reasonably certain that any observed change in labor demand will persist.
While we would expect the adjustment of employment to be slower in Germany than in
the United States, we would expect greater adjustment of average hours for workers in the short
run.  The fact that employment adjustment costs are typically higher in Germany than in the
United States should increase employers' reliance on hours adjustments.  In addition, absent
works council opposition to schedule changes, the availability of short-time compensation and
lower German overtime premia make it less costly for German employers to adjust average hours
per worker.   A priori, it is unclear whether the adjustment of total labor input is more or less10
costly in Germany than in the United States, and thus unclear whether German employers are,
in fact, less able to adjust labor input to changes in demand.  
To analyze this issue empirically, we model the dynamic adjustment of employment and
hours to fluctuations in output using the following interrelated factor demand model:
where E is production employment; h is average hours per production worker; S is shipments;
t and t  are time trends; and the 's, 's, and 's are parameters to be estimated.  This system2
of equations allows for the fact that the paths of adjustment of employment and hours may be
interdependent; not only does the adjustment of a particular factor depend on changes in
shipments, but it also depends on the path of adjustment of other factors.11
7     We also estimated models with data that had not been seasonally adjusted.  In general, the results are quite similar12
to those reported in this paper.
     The automobile industry is the only industry included for which the German and U.S. definitions are not wholly13
comparable; the German classification includes bicycles, while the U.S. classification does not.  
     We estimate standard errors associated with the simulated adjustment paths using "boot-strap" methods.14
Specifically, we use Monte Carlo simulation techniques to randomly perturb the estimated coefficients in equations (1a)
and (1b), and generate new simulated paths of adjustment for employment and hours.  The reported standard errors are
calculated as the standard deviation of the values at the associated lag lengths of 100 Monte Carlo simulations.  
We estimate this model using quarterly, seasonally adjusted data.   We estimate each12
equation in the model independently.  Based on the results of Durbin-h tests, we correct for first-
order serial correlation in the equation error terms, where appropriate.  Separate models were
specified for aggregate manufacturing and for eleven disaggregated manufacturing industries in
each country.  We take care to identify comparably defined industries because we wanted, insofar
as possible, to hold constant technological factors that might affect labor adjustment patterns in
drawing cross-county comparisons.   Data limitations unfortunately prevent the inclusion of any13
nonmanufacturing industries in our analysis.  Sources and additional details concerning the data
are provided in the data appendix.
We use the parameter estimates from equations (1a) and (1b) to simulate the dynamic
effects of a one-unit, permanent shock to shipments on production employment, average
production hours, and total production worker hours.  Implied responses over different horizons,
along with their associated standard errors, are reported in Table 1.   (Selected coefficients from14
the models underlying these simulations are reported in appendix Table 1a.)  For aggregate
German manufacturing, for example, Table 1 shows that a one percent decrease (increase) in
shipments would result in a 0.17 percent decrease (increase) in production employment, a 0.40
percent decrease (increase) in average hours, and a 0.57 percent decrease (increase) in total
production hours in the quarter contemporaneous to the shock.  Assuming the decrease to
shipments persists, four quarters following the initial one percent shock, employment would have
decreased an estimated 0.69 percent, average hours would be 0.17 percent lower, and so total
hours would be 0.85 percent lower.
The results for aggregate manufacturing, indicate that German employers rely relatively
more on changes in hours per worker to adjust total labor input in the short run, whereas even
in the short run U.S. employers rely primarily on adjustments to the number of workers.
Although employment adjustment is significantly greater in the United States than in Germany
across all time horizons examined here, the adjustment of average hours is greater in Germany,
significantly so in the contemporaneous quarter.  In the quarter that a shock to shipments occurs,
average hours adjustment accounts for about 70 percent of total hours adjustment in Germany,
whereas in the United States employment adjustment accounts for about 70 percent of initial
adjustment.  As expected, average hours adjustment declines both in an absolute and in a relative
sense in Germany over time, as employers alter employment in response to a permanent shock.
8     As noted above, the German street vehicles industry includes bicycles whereas the U.S. auto industry does not.15
Figure 1 depicts these quite different patterns of employment and hours adjustment in Germany
and the United States.  
Although the adjustment of average hours is greater in German than in U.S. aggregate
manufacturing, this greater average hours adjustment does not fully compensate for the smaller
adjustment of employment in the short run, and total hours adjustment is significantly smaller in
German manufacturing up to four quarters after the shock.  Results for aggregate manufacturing
may be somewhat misleading, however, if the composition of the manufacturing sector is
different in the two countries and adjustment patterns differ substantially across detailed industries
within countries.  To investigate this possibility, we estimate employment and hours adjustment
models for ten manufacturing industries for which we could develop a clean concordance between
the German and U.S. data.  Because of economists' and policymakers' interest in the automotive
sector, we also include that industry in our comparison.   15
When we examine the results for the disaggregated industries a somewhat different picture
emerges.  For only two industries--stone, clay and glass and non-electrical machinery--is short-
run total hours adjustment significantly greater in the United States than in Germany.  In five of
the eleven industries—paper, leather, primary metals, electrical equipment, and autos—we
generally observe significantly greater employment adjustment in the United States and
significantly greater average hours adjustment in Germany over short time horizons.  In these
industries, however, the greater initial  adjustment of average hours in Germany appears to
compensate for the slower adjustment of employment levels, and the adjustment of total labor
input is not significantly different in the two countries. In another three industries—textiles,
apparel and instruments—adjustment patterns are quite similar in the two countries; the short-run
adjustment of employment, average hours and total hours does not differ significantly in Germany
and the United States.  Finally, in one industry, printing, the adjustment of total hours is actually
significantly greater in Germany than in the United States, owing to the significantly greater
short-run adjustment of employment in Germany.  
In sum, we find that, contrary to popular belief, German manufacturing industries
generally adjust labor input as quickly as do U.S. manufacturing industries in response to demand
shocks.  In most industries short-run employment adjustment is smaller in Germany than in the
United States, often significantly so.  In most of these industries, however, significantly greater
short-run average hours adjustment compensates for the slower adjustment of employment, and
there is no significant difference in total hours adjustment.
These results are consistent with those reported in earlier studies comparing employment
and hours adjustment in German and U.S. manufacturing industries.  Houseman (1988) and
Kohler and Sengenberger (1983) studied adjustment in steel and autos, respectively.  Both found
that German employers adjust employment levels less, but average hours per worker more, in the
short run in response to demand shocks.  In Abraham and Houseman (1993, forthcoming), we
9     Houseman (1988) did report slower total hours adjustment in the German than in the U.S. steel industry using a16
finite distributed lag model.  In Abraham and Houseman (1993), in which we used a model similar to that in Houseman
(1988), we found that once differences in demand conditions were taken into account, differences in total hours
adjustment in the German and U.S. primary metals industry largely disappeared.
found that employment adjustment generally was significantly slower in the German than in the
U.S. manufacturing industries studied, but that total hours adjustment was more similar and often
insignificantly different, implying that average hours adjustment was generally greater in
Germany.    16
One way of inferring the effects of German employment protection laws is to compare,
as we have just done, employment and hours adjustment in Germany with that in another country,
such as the United States, in which there is little regulation of layoffs.  Another way of inferring
the effects of these laws is to test for changes in employment adjustment that coincide with major
changes in employment protection laws.  If these laws have a major effect on the way German
employers adjust employment, we would expect the speed of employment adjustment to slow
following the imposition of more stringent regulations and, conversely, to increase following the
relaxation of regulations.  
Recent history offers two such events in Germany.  The first is the introduction of the
requirement that employers negotiate a social plan with the works council in the event of a mass
layoff, which was embodied in the 1972 Amendments to the Works Constitution Act.  This social
plan requirement is widely regarded as the among the most important provisions in German
employment law.  In Abraham and Houseman (1993), however, we report evidence to suggest
that this law had, at most, a marginal effect on employer behavior.  Even before the social plan
requirement was enacted, employers in the German manufacturing sector relied primarily on the
adjustment of average hours per worker, and very little on that of employment levels, to vary
labor input in the short run.  
Some observers have suggested that German adjustment patterns were greatly altered by
this new requirement.  Legislation such as the 1972 amendments to the Works Constitution Act
often is treated as an exogenous event that forces significant changes in the typical employer's
behavior.  It may be more realistic, however, to treat such legislation as a codification of what
has come to be viewed as best practice.  If this view is correct, the amendments to the Works
Constitution Act may have forced changes in the behavior of some marginal employers whose
previous behavior lay outside the norm, but is unlikely to have caused major changes in the
behavior of the typical employer.  
The 1985 Employment Promotion Act, which weakened employment protection, was a
second significant change in German law.  This legislation exempted new employers from the
requirements of negotiating a social plan, raised the threshold that defines a mass layoff, and
relaxed restrictions on the use of temporary workers who are not subject to the laws' provisions.
Again, at least some observers have characterized these as significant changes.  In Abraham and
10
Houseman (forthcoming), however, we find no change in the speed of adjustment of employment
or hours after 1985.  This finding echoes that of Kraft (1990) who also finds no evidence of a
change in the speed of employment adjustment after 1985 in tests based on data for 21 German
manufacturing industries.
IV. Short-Time Work in Germany
We have shown that in the German manufacturing sector employers primarily vary the
hours that their employees work, rather than the number of employees they hire, to adjust labor
input to demand changes in the short run.  In contrast, American employers extensively adjust
employment to changes in demand conditions, even in the short run. Unemployment compensation
for short-time work is an important component of the German UI system and facilitates the use
of hours adjustment there, whereas most states in the United States do not offer benefits to
workers on short time. Below we assess the importance of short-time work to overall labor
adjustment in Germany and evaluate the relative merits of short-time work as an alternative to
layoffs.
Figure 2 provides some evidence that fluctuations in short time are a significant factor in
German adjustment.  The figure depicts the percent of workers in German manufacturing on
short-time work from 1973 to 1990 using seasonally adjusted monthly data.  During good years
few workers are on short time. The number rises sharply during recessions. At the trough of the
recession in the mid-1970s about 16 percent of manufacturing workers were on short time.  Even
at the trough of the recession in the early 1980s, which was considerably milder than the earlier
recession, over 12 percent of manufacturing workers were on short time.  
In earlier work (Abraham and Houseman 1993, forthcoming), we have attempted to
characterize the contribution of variation in short-time hours to observed labor adjustment in a
somewhat more formal fashion.  Our general strategy has been to ask how the adjustment of total
hours would have differed had no workers been placed on short time, assuming that employers'
adjustment behavior otherwise remained unchanged. We have addressed this question by
comparing alternative models of total hours adjustment fit using as our hours measure, first,
actual total production hours and, second, the hypothetical total number of production hours
obtained by adding hours of short-time compensation paid to the number of production hours
actually worked.  The results of this sort of exercise can be used to answer questions concerning
the share of the total adjustment of hours in response to a shock to shipments accounted for by
short time hours.
In Abraham and Houseman (1993), we reported finite distributed lag models of hours
adjustment, with and without hours changes attributable to short time, to changes in shipments,
fit using data for each of nine disaggregated manufacturing industries covering the 1974 to 1984
time period.  The share of current quarter hours adjustment attributable to variation in short time
hours averaged about 45 percent and that at lags of one to two quarters averaged in excess of 60
11
     These results are available upon request.17
     Figure 2 in Katz and Meyer (1990) indicates that the aggregate new job hazard, a measure of the instantaneous18
probability that an unemployed person will take a new job, is about 0.025, while the results in their Table 6 suggest that,
all else the same, the new job hazard is roughly 40 percent lower for persons who initially expect to be recalled to their
previous job.  Given that about 75 percent of their sample begins their layoff spell expecting to be recalled, a reasonable
percent.  In Abraham and Houseman (forthcoming), we used Koyck models fit with data for the
1973 to 1990 period to assess the contribution of short time to hours adjustment in the
manufacturing sector as a whole.  Our estimates implied that, absent the hours changes directly
associated with receipt of short time compensation, the current quarter adjustment of total hours
to a change in production would have been 40 percent smaller than that actually observed.
As a check on the robustness of the conclusions drawn from our earlier work, we also
have estimated a more complete set of hours adjustment models for the 1973 to 1990 time period.
This new estimation added models for the full set of disaggregated manufacturing industries for
which the requisite data could be obtained and, for closer comparability with the work reported
in the present paper, substituted shipments for production as the measure of output, but otherwise
used the same approach as Abraham and Houseman (forthcoming).  Both for manufacturing as
a whole and for each of the seven disaggregated manufacturing industries for which the models
could be estimated, we again find that variation in short-time hours makes an important
contribution to observed labor adjustment.17
Benefits for short-time work in Germany are intended primarily, though not exclusively,
for workers affected by temporary reductions in demand.  In the United States the structure of
the UI system encourages the use of temporary layoffs rather than short-time work during
downturns in demand.  Temporary layoffs, which are common in the United States, are virtually
unknown in Germany.  From the employer's perspective, there is a sense in which the use of
short time and the use of temporary layoffs are close functional substitutes.  Both allow a
temporary reduction in labor costs during a period of slack demand.  There are, however,
important respects in which the two differ.  
First, a temporary layoff may significantly disrupt the production process.  Unless the
temporary layoff affects the entire work force, it is likely to require a substantial reorganization
of work assignments.  If senior employees enjoy bumping rights, laying off even a small number
of workers may lead to a large number of job reassignments.  When workers are later recalled,
productivity may suffer as workers who have been away from the job for an extended period
become reacclimated to the work they are doing.
Second, there is a significant risk that employees placed on temporary layoff will not be
available for recall.  Rough calculations based on the findings reported in Katz and Meyer (1990)
indicate that, over the duration of a temporary layoff that lasts thirteen weeks, 25 percent of
workers on temporary layoff take a new job; over the duration of a twenty-six week temporary
layoff, 40 percent of those on layoff take a new job.   If workers who had been temporarily laid18
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estimate of the new job hazard for this group is about 0.021.  This is the hazard assumed in arriving at the numbers in
the text.
     There also would be some voluntary attrition during an extended period of short-time work, but quit rates are19
typically far below the loss rates from temporary layoff status implied by Katz and Meyer's figures.
     Katz and Meyer (1990, p. 981).20
     Katz and Meyer's figure 2 indicates that the aggregate recall hazard, a measure of the instantaneous probability that21
an unemployed person will be recalled to the previous job, averages about 0.050 during the first fifteen weeks following
a layoff, then drops to about 0.010.  The results in their Table 6 suggest that the recall hazard is about ten times greater
for persons who initially expect to be recalled
than for persons who do not.  A reasonable estimate of the recall hazard for persons who begin their spell expecting to
be recalled is 0.065 during the first fifteen weeks of a layoff spell and about 0.013 thereafter.  These are the hazards used
to compute the numbers in the text.
off do not return, the firm must incur the costs of hiring and training replacement workers.  The
costs associated with hiring and training new employees largely could be avoided if workers were
placed on short time instead of on temporary layoff.19
Moreover, short time and temporary layoffs are not the same from the employee's
perspective.  Workers on temporary layoff are likely to face great uncertainty about whether they
will ever be recalled.  Findings reported by Katz and Meyer indicate that, among laid off workers
who initially believe that they will be recalled, only about 70 percent end up returning to their
previous employer.   This low percentage in part reflects the fact that some workers choose to20
take new jobs, but also occurs because many workers never receive recall notices.  Rough
calculations based on Katz and Meyer's econometric analysis of layoff spells suggests that as
many as 25 percent of workers who initially believe that their layoff spell will be temporary do
not receive a recall notice within a year following the layoff.   Workers on temporary layoff who21
are never recalled experience longer than average unemployment spells, in part because they are
less likely to look for new work than workers who are certain their layoff is permanent and in
part because potential employers are reluctant to hire someone who may quit if recalled to their
previous job.  These lengthy spells of unemployment represent a loss of income for the individual
workers and a loss of resources to society.
Extensive reliance on layoffs is also less equitable than work sharing, for it concentrates
the costs of adjustment on a relatively small number of workers who suffer large losses of income
and other job-related benefits.  Short-time work arrangements spread the costs of adjustment more
evenly across members of the work force.
Short-time work may be used to accommodate structural as well as cyclical downturns.
In a permanent decline in demand, the use of short-time work does not prevent employment
reductions; rather, the temporary use of hours reduction measures can help an employer achieve
work force reductions with minimal resort to layoffs.  By extending the time over which these
13
     Podgursky and Swaim (1987, p. 216). 22
     Seitchik and Zornitsky (1989, p. 67).23
work force reductions occur, employers can make greater use of attrition and other alternatives
to layoff.
The use of short-time work in instances of structural adjustment is, however, more
controversial.  Economists typically take the position that in a permanent decline in demand,
workers should be reallocated to other sectors as quickly as possible.  To achieve this aim, large-
scale layoffs, when necessary, have been advocated, on the assumption that dislocated workers
will then be forced to find new employment.  Several recent studies of displaced workers in the
United States show, however, that workers permanently laid off from their jobs often experience
long periods of unemployment.  Among displaced workers aged 20 to 61 who lost full-time jobs
between 1979 and 1981, for example, 31 percent of male blue-collar workers, 38 percent of
female blue-collar workers, 14 percent of male white-collar workers, and 28 percent of female
white-collar workers experienced more than a year of subsequent joblessness.   Only 65 percent22
of prime-aged full-time workers displaced during 1984 held full-time jobs in January 1986; 8
percent held part-time jobs, 16 percent were unemployed, and 11 percent had withdrawn from
the labor force.  23
By using short-time work as an interim adjustment measure and relying on attrition to
reduce the work force, firms can greatly reduce or even avoid layoffs.  In this way, job
reductions occur among those who have the most attractive outside opportunities or who are best
able to relocate, and those who have poor outside opportunities or who are unable to relocate are
not thrown out of work.
V. Inventory Adjustment
In the dynamic factor demand models estimated above, we allow only employment and
average hours per worker to vary in the short run.  The theoretical literature in economics,
however, has long speculated that companies use finished goods inventories to buffer production
and labor against short-run fluctuations in demand.  Under the assumption that there are
significant costs to adjusting labor and other factor inputs, firms might be expected to build up
finished goods inventories during a downturn and to draw down inventory stocks during an upturn
to mitigate costly changes in production and labor.  If, in fact, the cost of adjusting labor input
is greater in Germany than in the United States, we might expect that finished goods inventories
would play a more important role in smoothing over demand fluctuations in Germany than in the
United States.
To assess their role in the adjustment process in Germany and the United States, we
expand the system of equations estimated above to incorporate inventories:
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     One key difference between our approach and that in Topel (1982) is in the modelling of demand.  Topel attempts24
to distinguish between anticipated and unanticipated demand shocks.  While this issue is of theoretical interest, whether
one can disentangle anticipated from unanticipated demand shocks econometrically is highly questionable.  
(2a)
(2b)
(2c)
where I represents finished goods inventories and all other variables are defined as above.  In this
model an equation is added to estimate the short-run response of finished goods inventories to
output changes.  In addition, employment and hours adjustment are assumed to depend upon the
path of adjustment of inventories. This model is quite similar to that estimated in Topel (1982).24
Several caveats should be noted concerning the data used to estimate these equations.
Unfortunately, inventory data for Germany, which come from a special survey conducted by the
IFO-Institute für Wirtschaftsforschung, are only available beginning in 1980.  Therefore, we
estimate equations (2a), (2b) and (2c) over the 1980-90 period, using seasonally adjusted,
quarterly data, for both Germany and the United States.  In addition, the IFO survey reports
finished goods inventories in terms of the equivalent number of weeks of shipments, rather than
in terms of the value of inventories.  To convert the German weeks-of-inventory terms to stock
values, we calculated the average weekly shipments over the preceding twelve months and
multiplied this figure by the reported number of weeks of inventories.  
Inventory data also are not reported for aggregate manufacturing in Germany.  To
construct an aggregate manufacturing series we summed the value of finished goods inventories
across all of the more detailed industries for which inventory data were reported and for which
we had shipments and labor market data.  We aggregated shipments, employment, and hours data
across the same set of industries to form a consistent series.  This aggregate industry represents
most of manufacturing.  The primary industries excluded are food and tobacco.
Finished goods inventory data are not available for the U.S. auto industry and, because
of changes in industry definitions, we do not have a complete series on inventories for the U.S.
electrical equipment and instruments industries.  In addition, because of missing post-1985
German shipments data, we do not report estimates of the expanded model for the paper industry.
Data sources and additional details concerning the construction of the variables used in our
analysis are given in the data appendix.  
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     We also have estimated equations (1a) and (1b) over the 1980-90 period for Germany and the United States.25
Estimated employment and hours adjustment is very similar to that in the model including inventories fit for the same
time period.
Paralleling the analysis reported above, we use the parameter estimates from equations
(2a), (2b) and (2c) to simulate the response of production employment, production hours, and
finished goods inventories to a one unit shock to shipments.  The results of these simulations are
summarized in Table 2.  (We report selected coefficient estimates from the equations underlying
these simulations in appendix Table 2A.)  The patterns of employment and hours adjustment
shown in Table 2 are similar to those shown in Table 1.  Short-run employment adjustment is
typically larger in the United States than in Germany.  Conversely, short-run average hours
adjustment is usually larger in Germany than in the United States.  In contrast to the estimates
reported in Table 1 for the 1973-90 period, the aggregate manufacturing equations for the 1980-
90 period do not imply a significant difference in the adjustment of total hours in the two
countries.  Consistent with the estimates for the 1973-90 period, the 1980-90 estimates for
disaggregated industries generally imply that total hours adjustment is not significantly different
in Germany and the United States.  In sum, comparisons of employment and hours adjustment
appear to be sensitive neither to the period of estimation nor to the inclusion of inventories in the
model.   25
If inventories serve as a buffer stock, one would expect inventories to fall when shipments
rise and to rise when shipments fall.  In Table 2, which shows the response of inventories to a
permanent one unit, positive shock to shipments, one would expect initial inventory adjustment
to be negative.  For aggregate manufacturing, inventory adjustment is negative for most time
horizons in both Germany and the United States, but is never significantly different from zero in
either country.  For the disaggregated industries reported in Table 2 inventory adjustment also
tends to be very imprecisely estimated in both countries.  Even where initial inventory adjustment
has the expected negative sign, it generally is not significantly different from zero.  
There are, however, several exceptions.  For the auto and instruments industries in
Germany and for the stone, clay and glass industry in the United States, inventory adjustment to
a change in shipments is large and statistically significant across all or most time horizons.  For
example, the simulations suggest that a one percent increase in shipments would result in a 1.98
percent decrease in inventories in the contemporaneous quarter in the German auto industry; a
1.21 percent decrease in inventories in the contemporaneous quarter in the German instruments
industry; and a 0.29 percent decrease in inventories in the contemporaneous quarter in the U.S.
stone, clay and glass industry.  These rather large inventories elasticities are noteworthy, of
course, only if inventories represent a sizable fraction of shipments in these industries.  Based
on a separate set of simulations in which the shock to shipments was evaluated at the mean of the
industry's shipments, only an estimated 6 percent share of an increase in shipments in the German
auto industry would be absorbed by lower inventory stocks in the quarter contemporaneous to the
shock to shipments.  In the German instruments industry and in the U.S. stone, clay and glass
industry inventories appear to play a more important role in buffering production.  In the German
16
     See Blinder and Maccini (1991) for a review of this literature.26
instruments industry, an increase in shipments is estimated to be more than matched by a fall in
inventories in the contemporaneous quarter and in the U.S. stone, clay and glass industry 19
percent of an increase in shipments would be absorbed by a decrease in inventories in the
contemporaneous quarter.  
These exceptions aside, the main conclusion to be drawn from Table 2 is that inventories
do not appear to play a significant role in smoothing over fluctuations in demand in either
Germany or the United States.  The results concerning U.S. inventory adjustment presented in
Table 2 are consistent with other research, which has found little evidence of a buffer role for
finished goods inventories in the United States.   Even in estimates of the inter-related factor26
demand model that includes inventories run over the 1973-90 period (not reported here) we find
no evidence to suggest that inventories play a substantial role in smoothing over fluctuations in
demand in the United States.  
Ideally, we would like to have estimated these inventory adjustment equations over a
longer time horizon for Germany.  German manufacturing experienced little cyclical fluctuation
during the 1980s, and it is possible that the imprecise estimates we obtain are partly due to the
lack of variation in the data.  Still, our basic finding that inventories do not appear to play a
significant buffer role in Germany is consistent with our findings concerning employment and
hours adjustment.  We hypothesized that if the costs of labor adjustment were higher in Germany
than in the United States so that German firms adjusted labor input more slowly to demand
changes than did U.S. firms, German firms would have a greater incentive to use inventories to
buffer fluctuations in demand.  However, we find that, although German firms adjust employment
more slowly than do U.S. firms, there is little difference in the adjustment of total labor input.
VI. Conclusion
Concerns about the potential impacts of job security legislation often are based upon the
perception that such legislation slows or prevents needed labor market adjustment.  Taken as a
whole, our results suggest that the primary difference between German and U.S. labor adjustment
lies not in the adjustment of total labor input, but rather in its division between adjustments to the
number of workers employed and adjustments to hours per worker. German companies rely much
more on the adjustment of average hours, including the use of short-time work, to reduce labor
input during downturns; American companies make greater use of employment adjustment, and
by implication layoffs.  At least in the German manufacturing sector, adjustment of hours per
worker serves as a short-run substitute for the adjustment of employment levels.
Likely reasons for the very different composition of labor adjustments in the two countries
are easy to identify.  German job security laws and prevailing German practice discourage the
adjustment of employment to changes in the demand for labor that may not prove to be permanent
17
and make rapid employment adjustment difficult, while the German unemployment insurance
system encourages reductions in hours during periods of slack demand and the relatively low
overtime premium may encourage adjustment of overtime hours.  In the United States, in
contrast, there are no legal barriers to layoffs, the unemployment insurance system offers positive
incentives to lay workers off rather than reduce their weekly hours, and the relatively high
mandatory overtime premium may discourage adjustment through variation in overtime hours.
Our results suggest that the higher costs of adjusting employment levels in Germany are offset,
in most cases, by lower costs of adjusting average hours, so that the adjustment of total labor
input in the two countries is similar.  Our findings concerning the adjustment of inventories in
response to demand changes supports this conclusion, albeit indirectly.  If the costs of adjusting
labor input were significantly greater in Germany, we might expect that employers would use
stocks of finished goods inventories to buffer fluctuations in demand to a greater degree than in
the United States.  In fact, we find little evidence to suggest that inventories are used for this
purpose in either country.
Taken as a whole, the evidence reported in this paper casts doubt on allegations that
dismissal legislation in West Germany has seriously hampered German firms' ability to adjust
their labor input in response to changing demand conditions.  Our findings suggest that, given the
presence of appropriate supporting institutions, strong worker job security can be compatible with
employers' need for flexibility in staffing levels.
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(A1)
Data Appendix
The German production employment, hours and shipments data come from a monthly
employer survey conducted by the Statistisches Bundesamt.  These data are published monthly
in Fachserie 4:Produzierendes Gewerbe, Reihe 4.1.1: Beschaeftigung, Umsatz und
Energieversorgung der Unternehmen und Betriebe im Bergbau und im Verarbeitenden Gewerbe,
issued by the Statistisches Bundesamt.  Complete post-1985 shipments data were not available for
the German paper industry.  For that reason, we have not estimated models for the 1980-90
period for paper.  The German shipments data were deflated by a producer price index for basic
industries, capital goods, consumer goods or food and tobacco, as appropriate.  Because of a
break in the German industry series, we do not use data prior to 1970.  German finished goods
inventory data come from a survey by IFO-Institute für Wirtschaftsforschung.  This survey is
conducted four times a year during the months of February, May, August, and November.
U.S. employment and hours data come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics' monthly
Employment, Payroll and Hours survey, as published monthly in Employment and Earnings.
U.S. shipments and finished goods inventory data were obtained from the Bureau of the Census's
Manufacturers' Shipments, Inventories and Orders data set; these data are published in Current
Industrial Reports:  Manufacturers' Shipments, Inventories and Orders, which appears annually.
Finished goods inventory data are not available for the U.S. auto industry.  In addition, as
explained below, complete inventory series were not available for all industries on a consistent
basis.  The U.S. shipments and inventory data were deflated using either the durable goods or the
nondurable goods producer price index.  
With the exception of the producer price deflators, all series used in the analysis were
obtained on magnetic media in unadjusted form and seasonally adjusted using the X-11 procedure
in SAS.  Because production employment was measured at the end of the month in Germany, but
at mid-month in the United States, we transformed the German production employment numbers,
defining:
These transformed numbers were used in all analyses.
The industries included in our analysis were matched using a bridge between the German
SYPRO industry codes and the 1972 U.S. SIC industry codes developed by Hideki Yamawaki.
Except for the automobile industry, all correspond to 2-digit SIC classifications.  The U.S. SIC
system was revised in 1987.  All of the U.S. employment and hours adjustment equations
summarized in Table 1 were estimated using data on a 1972 SIC basis.  The 1987 SIC revisions
resulted in major changes in the composition of SIC 36, electrical equipment, and SIC 38,
instruments.  We were unable to obtain recent finished goods inventory data on a 1972 basis and
pre-1988 employment and hours data for these industries are not available on a 1987 basis.  They
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therefore are excluded from our analysis of employment, hours and inventories adjustment.  The
1987 revisions also affected the composition of SIC 32, stone, clay and glass, and SIC 35,
nonelectrical machinery, though in a much less significant way.  For these industries we estimate
the employment, hours and inventories models summarized in Table 2 using data on a 1987 SIC
basis.  
All of the U.S. series are constructed using a "link relative" approach, meaning that the
percentage change in the series value between period t and period t-1 is first calculated using data
from those establishments filing returns in both periods, and the period t value then determined
by applying this percentage change to the period t-1 value.  The German series are not
constructed in this way.  Whether for this or some other reason, the German shipments series
were considerably noisier than the corresponding U.S. series even after they had been seasonally
adjusted.  For that reason and because German inventory data are only available on a quarterly
basis, we averaged the monthly data for both countries to construct quarterly observations, which
have been used in the reported analysis.  Again, however, making this adjustment had no
important effect on any of our findings.
Neither country's data series are adjusted for the effect of strikes.  We have added strike
dummies to our estimating equations for the German automobile, primary metals and printing
industries in those quarters affected by large strikes.  This has the effect of slightly reducing the
estimated adjustment of hours worked to changes in output.
The data used in the preparation of Figure 2 makes use of monthly data on the number of
manufacturing workers collecting short-time payments.  These numbers were taken from
Amtliche Nachrichten der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit - Jahreszahlen (various issues).
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Table 1
Simulated Adjustment of Production Employment and 
Production Hours to a Permanent One-Unit Shock
to Shipments in German and U.S. Manufacturing Industries, 1973-901
Industry/Lag
Employment Average Hours Total Hours
Germany U.S. Germany U.S. Germany U.S.
Manufacturing
Current
Quarter
.17*
(.02)
.54
(.04)
.40*
(.05)
.22
(.03)
.57*
(.06)
.75
(.05)
1 Quarter .35*
(.04)
.85
(.05)
.38
(.06)
.25
(.03)
.73*
(.07)
1.11
(.05)
2 Quarters .49*
(.06)
1.02
(.05)
.30
(.06)
.22
(.03)
.79*
(.07)
1.24
(.05)
4 Quarters .69*
(.08)
1.11
(.06)
.17
(.07)
.12
(.04)
.85*
(.07)
1.24
(.05)
6 Quarters .81*
(.10)
1.11
(.06)
.08
(.07)
.07
(.05)
.89*
(.08)
1.18
(.06)
Textiles
Current
Quarter
.14*
(.02)
.27
(.05)
.26
(.05)
.23
(.07)
.40
(.05)
.49
(.08)
1 Quarter .28
(.04)
.39
(.06)
.31
(.06)
.24
(.04)
.60
(.07)
.62
(.07)
2 Quarters .41
(.05)
.42
(.06)
.30
(.06)
.21
(.05)
.71
(.08)
.64
(.07)
4 Quarters .62
(.08)
.43
(.07)
.21
(.07)
.19
(.05)
.83
(.10)
.62
(.08)
6 Quarters .77*
(.11)
.43
(.07)
.13
(.08)
.19
(.06)
.90
(.12)
.62
(.08)
Apparel
Current
Quarter
.17
(.02)
.13
(.04)
.15
(.05)
.06
(.02)
.32
(.06)
.19
(.05)
1 Quarter .35
(.04)
.21
(.06)
.15
(.06)
.08
(.03)
.50*
(.07)
.29
(.06)
2 Quarters .50*
(.05)
.26
(.07)
.10
(.06)
.09
(.03)
.60*
(.09)
.35
(.07)
4 Quarters .72*
(.08)
.31
(.09)
-.01
(.06)
.08
(.04)
.71*
(.10)
.39
(.08)
Table 1
(Continued)
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Industry/Lag
Employment Average Hours Total Hours
Germany U.S. Germany U.S. Germany U.S.
6 Quarters .86*
(.10)
.33
(.12)
-.09
(.06)
.07
(.05)
.77*
(.12)
.39
(.10)
Paper2
Current
Quarter
.03*
(.04)
.25
(.06)
.30*
(.06)
.06
(.03)
.33
(.07)
.31
(.06)
1 Quarter .11*
(.07)
.37
(.07)
.33*
(.09)
.07
(.04)
.44
(.11)
.44
(.08)
2 Quarters .18
(.11)
.42
(.07)
.32*
(.10)
.06
(.05)
.51
(.15)
.48
(.09)
4 Quarters .31
(.17)
.42
(.07)
.30*
(.11)
.04
(.06)
.60
(.20)
.46
(.11)
6 Quarters .40
(.22)
.41
(.07)
.27
(.11)
.03
(.07)
.68
(.24)
.44
(.12)
Printing
Current
Quarter
.20*
(.02)
.06
(.02)
.16*
(.04)
.04
(.02)
.36*
(.05)
.10
(.02)
1 Quarter .38*
(.04)
.12
(.03)
.10
(.03)
.06
(.02)
.49*
(.05)
.18
(.03)
2 Quarters .52*
(.05)
.19
(.03)
.05
(.03)
.07
(.02)
.57*
(.05)
.26
(.04)
4 Quarters .72*
(.05)
.30
(.04)
-.03*
(.03)
.07
(.02)
.69*
(.05)
.36
(.05)
6 Quarters .84*
(.06)
.37
(.05)
-.09*
(.03)
.06
(.02)
.76*
(.05)
.44
(.06)
Leather
Current
Quarter
.19
(.03)
.21
(.04)
.28*
(.06)
.09
(.03)
.47
(.07)
.31
(.05)
1 Quarter .36
(.04)
.35
(.07)
.28*
(.07)
.11
(.04)
.64
(.08)
.46
(.07)
2 Quarters .49
(.05)
.43
(.10)
.21
(.07)
.10
(.04)
.70
(.08)
.53
(.10)
4 Quarters .65
(.06)
.51
(.17)
.07
(.06)
.06
(.05)
.73
(.08)
.57
(.15)
Table 1
(Continued)
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Industry/Lag
Employment Average Hours Total Hours
Germany U.S. Germany U.S. Germany U.S.
6 Quarters .74
(.07)
.53
(.22)
-.01
(.06)
.04
(.06)
.73
(.08)
.57
(.18)
Stone, Clay and Glass
Current
Quarter
.12*
(.01)
.32
(.04)
.19
(.03)
.13
(.02)
.31*
(.03)
.44
(.04)
1 Quarter .23*
(.02)
.54
(.06)
.22
(.03)
.17
(.02)
.45*
(.03)
.71
(.05)
2 Quarters .32*
(.03)
.68
(.07)
.21
(.03)
.17
(.02)
.53*
(.04)
.85
(.06)
4 Quarters .46*
(.04)
.83
(.08)
.18
(.03)
.12
(.03)
.64*
(.05)
.95
(.06)
6 Quarters .58*
(.05)
.87
(.08)
.14
(.03)
.08
(.04)
.72*
(.06)
.96
(.07)
Primary Metals
Current
Quarter
.08*
(.02)
.37
(.04)
.43*
(.05)
.15
(.01)
.51
(.05)
.52
(.04)
1 Quarter .16*
(.04)
.53
(.04)
.34*
(.05)
.15
(.02)
.50*
(.06)
.68
(.04)
2 Quarters .22*
(.05)
.59
(.04)
.32*
(.05)
.11
(.02)
.54*
(.06)
.70
(.04)
4 Quarters .31*
(.08)
.61
(.05)
.28*
(.06)
.06
(.03)
.59
(.08)
.67
(.05)
6 Quarters .36*
(.10)
.61
(.06)
.26*
(.06)
.04
(.04)
.62
(.10)
.65
(.04)
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Employment Average Hours Total Hours
Germany U.S. Germany U.S. Germany U.S.
Nonelectrical Machinery
Current
Quarter
.01*
(.01)
.52
(.07)
.13
(.04)
.16
(.03)
.14*
(.04)
.68
(.08)
1 Quarter .03*
(.03)
.84
(.09)
.18
(.06)
.21
(.04)
.21*
(.06)
1.05
(.09)
2 Quarters .05*
(.04)
1.03
(.09)
.21
(.06)
.20
(.05)
.26*
(.07)
1.23
(.09)
4 Quarters .07*
(.07)
1.18
(.10)
.22
(.07)
.11
(.05)
.29*
(.09)
1.29
(.09)
6 Quarters .09*
(.11)
1.18
(.10)
.21
(.07)
.04
(.06)
.31*
(.11)
1.23
(.08)
Electrical Equipment
Current
Quarter
.13*
(.03)
.37
(.06)
.52*
(.06)
.07
(.02)
.65*
(.06)
.44
(.06)
1 Quarter .28*
(.07)
.63
(.07)
.59*
(.07)
.09
(.03)
.87
(.09)
.72
(.08)
2 Quarters .40*
(.11)
.79
(.08)
.54*
(.08)
.09
(.03)
.94
(.11)
.88
(.09)
4 Quarters .54
(.18)
.92
(.10)
.41*
(.11)
.05
(.04)
.95
(.12)
.97
(.10)
6 Quarters .61
(.25)
.93
(.12)
.33
(.15)
.02
(.05)
.94
(.13)
.95
(.11)
Autos
Current
Quarter
.13*
(.01)
.43
(.04)
.48*
(.05)
.19
(.02)
.61
(.06)
.62
(.04)
1 Quarter .29*
(.03)
.60
(.04)
.41*
(.06)
.18
(.02)
.70
(.07)
.79
(.03)
2 Quarters .42*
(.04)
.67
(.04)
.35*
(.07)
.16
(.02)
.77
(.08)
.82
(.03)
4 Quarters .63
(.05)
.71
(.04)
.25
(.07)
.11
(.02)
.89
(.10)
.82
(.04)
6 Quarters .78
(.07)
.72
(.05)
.19
(.08)
.10
(.02)
.97
(.13)
.82
(.04)
Instruments
Table 1
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Employment Average Hours Total Hours
Germany U.S. Germany U.S. Germany U.S.
Current
Quarter
.13
(.03)
.20
(.05)
.13
(.03)
.11
(.03)
.26
(.04)
.30
(.06)
1 Quarter .26
(.05)
.38
(.09)
.14
(.04)
.17
(.05)
.40
(.06)
.56
(.10)
2 Quarters .36
(.06)
.55
(.12)
.12
(.04)
.20
(.06)
.48
(.06)
.75
(.14)
4 Quarters .49
(.07)
.78
(.19)
.05*
(.04)
.22
(.06)
.54*
(.07)
1.00
(.20)
6 Quarters .55
(.09)
.91
(.25)
.01*
(.05)
.20
(.07)
.56*
(.08)
1.11
(.25)
 Standard errors are in parentheses.  An asterisk denotes that German-U.S. difference is1
significant at .05 level, two-tailed test.
 German paper industry results are for the 1973-85 period.2
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Table 2
Simulated Adjustment of Production Employment,
Production Hours and Finished Goods Inventories to a Permanent One-Unit
Shock to Shipments in German and U.S. Manufacturing Industries, 1980-901
Industry/Lag
Employment Average Hours Total Hours Inventories
Germany U.S. Germany U.S. Germany U.S. Germany U.S.
Manufacturing
Current
Quarter
.16*
(.03)
.47
(.04)
.48*
(.06)
.21
(.03)
.63
(.07)
.68
(.05)
-.05
(.29)
-.26
(.23)
1 Quarter .34*
(.05)
.74
(.05)
.42
(.08)
.25
(.04)
.76*
(.09)
.98
(.06)
-.06
(.45)
-.32
(.33)
2 Quarters .50*
(.07)
.88
(.07)
.36
(.07)
.22
(.05)
.86
(.10)
1.10
(.07)
-.08
(.58)
-.25
(.40)
4 Quarters .72
(.10)
.96
(.10)
.28
(.08)
.13
(.07)
1.00
(.11)
1.09
(.11)
-.16
(.77)
-.01
(.55)
6 Quarters .88
(.12)
.93
(.12)
.22
(.08)
.09
(.08)
1.10
(.13)
1.02
(.14)
-.24
(.95)
.26
(.73)
Textiles
Current
Quarter
.14
(.03)
.25
(.05)
.63*
(.08)
.28
(.06)
.76
(.09)
.52
(.09)
-.34
(.30)
-.08
(.09)
1 Quarter .37
(.05)
.39
(.06)
 .56*
(.10)
.31
(.06)
.93
(.12)
.70
(.08)
-.24
(.50)
-.01
(.16)
2 Quarters .57
(.08)
.47
(.06)
 .52
(.11)
.27
(.07)
1.09
(.16)
.74
(.08)
-.19
(.68)
 .09
(.22)
4 Quarters .93*
(.15)
.53
(.09)
 .45
(.18)
.17
(.10)
1.37*
(.26)
.70
(.11)
-.12
(.97)
.25
(.32)
6 Quarters 1.22*
(.23)
.53
(.12)
 .39
(.24)
.13
(.14)
1.61*
(.38)
.66
(.13)
-.08
(1.27)
.33
(.42)
Apparel
Current
Quarter
.13
(.04)
.10
(.05)
.24*
(.07)
.06
(.05)
.36*
(.08)
.16
(.06)
.19
(.45)
.06
(.18)
1 Quarter .27
(.07)
.17
(.07)
.25
(.08)
.09
(.08)
.52
(.11)
.26
(.11)
.31
(.54)
.22
(.30)
2 Quarters .41
(.09)
.21
(.10)
.23
(.08)
.10
(.09)
.64
(.13)
.31
(.14)
.13
(.55)
.43
(.39)
4 Quarters .63*
(.14)
.22
(.13)
.18
(.08)
.08
(.11)
.80
(.17)
.31
(.18)
-.35
(.54)
.79
(.53)
Table 2
(Continued)
29
Industry/Lag
Employment Average Hours Total Hours Inventories
Germany U.S. Germany U.S. Germany U.S. Germany U.S.
6 Quarters .77*
(.18)
.19
(.15)
 .14
(.08)
.07
(.11)
.90*
(.20)
.26
(.20)
-.74
(.57)
.93
(.64)
Printing
Current
Quarter
.15
(.06)
.08
(.03)
 .72*
(.12)
.01
(.02)
 .87*
(.14)
.10
(.04)
-1.14
(3.13)
.74
(.21)
1 Quarter .26
(.13)
.12
(.04)
 .55*
(.15)
.02
(.03)
 .81*
(.19)
.14
(.06)
4.68
(5.16)
.93
(.25)
2 Quarters .34
(.19)
.15
(.06)
 .52*
(.14)
.02
(.04)
 .86*
(.21)
.16
(.08)
6.18
(5.77)
.99
(.30)
4 Quarters .45
(.30)
.18
(.10)
 .47*
(.17)
.01
(.04)
 .92*
(.30)
.20
(.13)
8.07
(6.68)
1.02
(.37)
6 Quarters .52
(.39)
.20
(.13)
 .44*
(.20)
.01
(.05)
 .97
(.39)
.21
(.16)
9.20
(7.75)
1.04
(.43)
Leather
Current
Quarter
.14
(.04)
.13
(.05)
.32*
(.07)
.04
(.04)
.46*
(.08)
.16
(.06)
.57
(.42)
 .07
(.13)
1 Quarter .28
(.07)
.19
(.08)
.30*
(.07)
.04
(.05)
.58*
(.09)
.23
(.09)
.76
(.65)
 .11
(.19)
2 Quarters .40
(.09)
.22
(.10)
.27*
(.08)
.03
(.07)
.67*
(.11)
.25
(.12)
.70
(.81)
.15
(.26)
4 Quarters .56
(.13)
.24
(.17)
 .18
(.09)
.01
(.10)
.74*
(.16)
.25
(.18)
 .18
(1.02)
.20
(.46)
6 Quarters .62
(.17)
.24
(.29)
 .10
(.11)
.00
(.15)
.73
(.19)
.24
(.29)
  .51
(1.19)
.21
(.88)
Stone, Clay and Glass
Current
Quarter
.08*
(.03)
.20
(.04)
.26*
(.04)
.12
(.02)
.34
(.05)
.33
(.05)
-.15
(.26)
-.29
(.09)
1 Quarter .12*
(.05)
.43
(.06)
.29*
(.05)
.17
(.03)
.42
(.07)
.60
(.07)
-.21
(.36)
-.42
(.13)
2 Quarters .15*
(.07)
.60
(.07)
.30*
(.06)
.16
(.03)
.47*
(.09)
.76
(.09)
-.17
(.44)
-.45
(.15)
4 Quarters .19*
(.11)
.70
(.08)
.31*
(.07)
.10
(.04)
.50
(.14)
.80
(.09)
-.06
(.55)
-.38
(.19)
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Employment Average Hours Total Hours Inventories
Germany U.S. Germany U.S. Germany U.S. Germany U.S.
6 Quarters .22*
(.15)
.66
(.09)
.31*
(.08)
.07
(.05)
.53
(.19)
.73
(.10)
 .01
(.64)
-.34
(.23)
Primary Metals
Current
Quarter
.09*
(.02)
.38
(.06)
.37*
(.06)
.12
(.02)
.46
(.07)
.50
(.06)
-.12
(.29)
.15
(.08)
1 Quarter .19*
(.05)
.53
(.07)
.30*
(.06)
.11
(.03)
.48
(.08)
.64
(.07)
-.35
(.33)
.33
(.13)
2 Quarters .26*
(.07)
.59
(.09)
.28*
(.05)
.06
(.04)
.54
(.09)
.65
(.08)
-.43*
(.41)
.56
(.21)
4 Quarters .37
(.14)
.60
(.15)
.25*
(.06)
-.01
(.06)
.62
(.15)
.60
(.13)
-.46*
(.56)
1.13
(.44)
6 Quarters  .44
(.24)
.61
(.22)
 .23*
(.07)
-.06
(.11)
.67
(.24)
.55
(.19)
-.44*
(.71)
1.75
(.81)
Non-Electrical Machinery
Current
Quarter
.02*
(.02)
.53
(.10)
.10
(.05)
.16
(.03)
.12*
(.05)
.69
(.10)
.36*
(.19)
-.35
(.29)
1 Quarter .04*
(.04)
.79
(.10)
.10
(.06)
.18
(.04)
.13*
(.07)
 .97
(.09)
.49
(.35)
-.30
(.34)
2 Quarters .05*
(.06)
.89
(.09)
.09
(.07)
.15
(.05)
.13*
(.09)
1.04
(.08)
.61
(.51)
-.12
(.38)
4 Quarters .05*
(.10)
.89
(.11)
.06
(.09)
.06
(.07)
.11*
(.14)
.96
(.09)
.85
(.81)
.26
(.51)
6 Quarters .03*
(.14)
.84
(.13)
.05
(.10)
 .01
(.09)
.08*
(.19)
.85
(.11)
1.07
(1.07)
.47
(.78)
Electrical Equipment
Current
Quarter
.07
(.05)
NA .49
(.09)
NA .57
(.09)
NA -.12
(.50)
NA
1 Quarter .16
(.10)
.46
(.12)
.62
(.13)
-.13
(.91)
2 Quarters .23
(.18)
.43
(.12)
.66
(.17)
-.49
(1.55)
4 Quarters .33
(.46)
.38
(.17)
.71
(.37)
-.56
(5.23)
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Industry/Lag
Employment Average Hours Total Hours Inventories
Germany U.S. Germany U.S. Germany U.S. Germany U.S.
6 Quarters .39
(1.15)
.35
(.31)
.74
(.91)
-.59
(22.94)
Autos
Current
Quarter
.10 
(.02)
NA .61 
(.11)
NA .71
(.11)
NA -1.98
(.90)
NA
1 Quarter    .20 
(.04)
.63 
(.16)
.82
(.16)
-3.59
(1.58)
2 Quarters .28
(.06)
.62
(.18)
.90
(.19)
-4.82
(2.09)
4 Quarters .42
(.11)
 .60
(.20)
1.02
(.23)
-6.53
(2.79)
6 Quarters .52
(.15)
 .58
(.22)
1.11
(.27)
-7.66
(3.29)
Instruments
Current
Quarter
.18
(.03)
NA .17
(.06)
NA .35
(.07)
NA -1.21
(.35)
NA
1 Quarter .37
(.04)
.14
(.04)
.51
(.07)
-1.30
(.34)
2 Quarters .51
(.05)
.08
(.04)
.58
(.07)
-1.04
(.34)
4 Quarters .65
(.06)
-.01
(.04)
.64
(.07)
-.56
(.36)
6 Quarters .70
(.06)
-.04
(.04)
.66
(.07)
-.34
(.40)
 Standard errors are in parentheses.  An asterisk denotes that the German-U.S. difference is1
significant at .05 level, two-tailed test.
Table 2A
Production Employment, Hours and Inventories Adjustment;
Selected Coefficient Estimates from an Inter-related Factor Demand Model
11 12 13 1 21 22 23 2 31 32 33 3
Germany
Manufacturing 0.860 
(0.036)
0.098 
(0.039)
0.003 
(0.013)
0.159 
(0.025)
-0.316 
(0.088)
-0.010 
(0.094)
-0.004
(0.031)
0.475 
(0.060)
-0.076
(0.318)
0.086 
(0.442)
0.765 
(0.136)
-0.048
(0.256)
Textiles 0.944 
(0.031)
0.146 
(0.042)
-0.021 
(0.011)
0.138 
(0.029)
-0.197 
(0.198)
-0.053 
(0.106)
0.007 
(0.035)
0.625 
(0.087)
0.120 
(0.365)
0.455 
(0.492)
0.606 
(0.128)
-0.339
(0.336)
Apparel 0.896 
(0.053)
0.141 
(0.077)
0.020 
(0.014)
0.125 
(0.041)
-0.142 
(0.091)
0.104 
(0.132)
0.029 
(0.023)
0.235 
(0.069)
-1.424
(0.632)
1.112 
(0.916)
0.177 
(0.161)
0.194 
(0.479)
Printing 0.788 
(0.089)
-0.013
(0.071)
-0.001 
(0.003)
0.148 
(0.061)
-0.302 
(0.297)
-0.181 
(0.136)
-0.005
(0.007)
0.718 
(0.140)
11.443 
(4.268)
6.102 
(3.403)
0.222 
(0.154)
-1.137
(2.947)
Leather 0.808 
(0.057)
0.028 
(0.066)
0.036 
(0.010)
0.138 
(0.037)
-0.335 
(0.112)
-0.023 
(0.128)
0.064 
(0.020)
0.320 
(0.072)
-1.503 
(0.559)
-0.212
(0.768)
0.819 
(0.113)
0.567 
(0.427)
Stone, Clay
and Glass
0.798 
(0.119)
-0.091
(0.065)
-0.014 
(0.016)
0.080 
(0.024)
0.136 
(0.199)
0.074 
(0.109)
-0.033
(0.026)
0.259 
(0.040)
1.757 
(1.223)
-0.639
(0.673)
0.204 
(0.162)
-0.150
(0.246)
Primary Metals 0.839 
(0.114)
0.063 
(0.040)
0.014 
(0.010)
0.090 
(0.022)
-0.260 
(0.143)
-0.135 
(0.126)
0.005 
(0.023)
0.368 
(0.059)
0.051 
(0.573)
-0.476
(0.693)
0.518 
(0.129)
-0.116
(0.283)
Nonelectrical
Machinery
0.875 
(0.080)
0.118 
(0.060)
-0.032 
(0.012)
0.019 
(0.019)
-0.286 
(0.093)
0.222 
(0.206)
-0.051
(0.024)
0.099 
(0.050)
0.394 
(0.327)
-1.746
(0.625)
0.815 
(0.087)
0.363 
(0.209)
Electrical
Equipment
0.790 
(0.372)
0.057 
(0.051)
-0.020 
(0.016)
0.071 
(0.047)
-0.403 
(0.068)
-0.010 
(0.103)
-0.007
(0.027)
0.493 
(0.081)
-0.368 
(0.593)
-0.416
(0.611)
0.323 
(0.656)
-0.116
(0.484)
Autos
0.949
(0.046)
0.029
(0.026)
0.006 
(0.003)
0.098 
(0.022)
-0.183 
(0.291)
0.043 
(0.176)
-0.005
(0.019)
0.607 
(0.113)
-2.819 
(1.796)
-0.308
(1.030)
0.583 
(0.125)
 -1.978
(0.849)
Instruments 0.773
(0.044)
0.283
(0.090)
0.001 
(0.013)
0.183 
(0.028)
-0.287 
(0.083)
0.200 
(0.242)
0.008 
(0.022)
0.166 
(0.056)
1.290 
(0.555)
-1.155
(1.127)
0.119 
(0.162)
-1.205
(0.357)
United States
Manufacturing 0.497 
(0.040)
0.039 
(0.145)
-0.101
(0.027)
0.470 
(0.040)
-0.187 
(0.031)
0.569 
(0.126)
-0.028
(0.021)
0.208 
(0.036)
0.448 
(0.193)
-0.237
(0.780)
0.840 
(0.132)
-0.260
(0.219)
Textiles 0.604 
(0.093)
-0.050
(0.070)
-0.107
(0.043)
0.248 
(0.042)
-0.407 
(0.072)
0.488 
(0.149)
-0.003
(0.043)
0.275 
(0.061)
0.317 
(0.201)
0.164 
(0.194)
0.725 
(0.162)
-0.077
(0.090)
Apparel 0.728 
(0.141)
0.117 
(0.156)
-0.076
(0.032)
0.095 
(0.043)
-0.076 
(0.102)
0.541 
(0.185)
-0.020
(0.029)
0.063 
(0.049)
1.441 
(0.530)
-0.117
(0.559)
0.658 
(0.175)
0.055 
(0.167)
Printing 0.851 
(0.041)
0.524 
(0.149)
-0.049
(0.016)
0.082 
(0.025)
-0.040 
(0.037)
0.698 
(0.135)
-0.004
(0.015)
0.013 
(0.023)
0.193 
(0.501)
-2.034
(1.235)
0.270 
(0.228)
0.742 
(0.210)
Leather 0.638 
(0.173)
-0.120
(0.208)
-0.200
(0.059)
0.127 
(0.043)
-0.116 
(0.050)
0.461 
(0.237)
-0.048
(0.043)
0.037 
(0.037)
0.187 
(0.178)
-0.239
(0.556)
0.504 
(0.432)
0.066 
(0.147)
Stone, Clay
and Glass
0.505 
(0.066)
0.556 
(0.202)
-0.196
(0.055)
0.201 
(0.042)
-0.160 
(0.036)
0.595 
(0.110)
-0.015
(0.030)
0.124 
(0.023)
0.298 
(0.142)
0.266 
(0.435)
0.777 
(0.118)
-0.291
(0.090)
Primary Metals 0.335 
(0.109)
0.189
(0.310)
0.022
(0.069)
0.379
(0.060)
-0.169 
(0.031)
0.430 
(0.113)
-0.047
(0.022)
0.123 
(0.020)
0.324 
(0.131)
-0.735
(0.586)
0.958 
(0.098)
0.152 
(0.087)
Nonelectrical
Machinery
0.383 
(0.082)
0.197 
(0.302)
-0.070
(0.055)
0.531 
(0.101)
-0.193 
(0.020)
0.763 
(0.082)
-0.014
(0.012)
0.159 
(0.028)
0.686 
(0.260)
-0.686
(1.194)
0.616 
(0.305)
-0.345
(0.296)
